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James Kahler (hereinafter “Kahler”) was a husband, father, and by all accounts a
hardworking law-abiding citizen, who committed one of the most unthinkable crimes:
murdering his family.1 Since it is undisputed that Kahler did indeed commit this heinous act,
any rational human being would immediately conclude that Kahler should be locked away,
with the proverbial key thrown away. This comment, however, argues the opposite. To be
clear, it does not argue Kahler should be free or continue to participate as a member of society
without any consequences. Instead, this comment analyzes the mental state of Kahler to
determine whether he is morally culpable for the crime based on his ability to understand right
from wrong when he killed his family. With the rapidly changing landscape and understanding
of mental illness in the United States, Kahler’s case has the potential to change the way society
views mental illness and its effect on an individual’s moral culpability.
The Supreme Court faced a difficult decision in Kahler v. Kansas, which could have
altered the future of criminal law in the United States if the Court decided abolishing the
insanity defense was unconstitutional.2 The constitutional question the Court faced was
whether a United States citizen has a constitutional right to the insanity defense. This question
arose from a dispute over a Kansas statute, K.S.A. § 21-5209 (hereinafter “the Kansas statute”),
which abolished the insanity defense. In a close 6-3 decision, the Court decided to uphold the
constitutionality of this statute.3
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See infra Part II.
Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Open New Term With Questions and Concerns About Insanity Defense
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/10/argument-analysis-justices-open-new-term-with-questions-and-concernsabout-insanity-defense/ (October 7th, 2019 3:58 pm) (“Justice Samuel Alito worried aloud that, if the ‘general rule’
were that a defendant cannot be convicted if he believed that his actions were moral, it would result in a
‘revolutionary change’ to criminal law.”).
3
Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 1910, at *1 (Mar. 23, 2020) (“The Due Process Clause does not
require States to provide an insanity defense that acquits a defendant who could not ‘distinguish right from wrong’
when committing his crime—or, otherwise put, the Clause does not require States to adopt the moral-incapacity test
from M’Naghten’s Case. The Court declined to require that Kansas adopt an insanity test turning on a defendant’s
2
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This constitutional question is, however, not the only question society must answer.
Society must answer whether, regardless of the Court’s decision, the insanity defense’s
abolishment is proper under a moral consideration. While there inevitably exists a distinction
between the law and morality, criminal law seeks to maintain only a minor separation between
the two.4 Any society permitting a law punishing one of its members who is not morally
blameworthy flirts with incivility.5 To prevent this incivility, certain theories of punishment
exist, which inform society’s justification for state sanctioned punishment. These theories of
punishment may prove to guide and inform criminal laws that punish an individual whose
blameworthiness is in question.
This comment will argue that any State’s abolishment of the insanity defense is unjust
because, under the criminal theories of punishment, such abolishment effectively allows the
state to wrongly punish morally blameless offenders. The wrongdoer’s moral culpability
comes into question when a mental illness inhibited the wrongdoer’s appreciation of the
criminal conduct when the crime occurred. This comment will specifically analyze the recent
Kansas statute, which abolished the insanity defense.6 With a close analysis of the
circumstances and expert testimony, Kahler may not have been morally culpable for the murder
of his family due to a serious mental affliction.
Even if Kahler had the ability, or even the mere chance, to utilize the insanity defense, it
would not have necessarily vindicated him. Instead, this comment argues that the Kansas
statute unfairly prevented Kahler from having the opportunity to admit evidence demonstrating
ability to recognize that his crime was morally wrong. Any manifestation of mental illness that Kansas’s guilt-phase
insanity defense disregards could come in later to mitigate culpability and lessen punishment.”).
4
Id. at *61 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (“But the criminal law nonetheless tries in various ways to prevent the distance
between criminal law and morality from becoming too great.”).
5
Id. (Breyer, J. dissenting) (“[T]o deny that criminal liability . . . is founded on blameworthiness . . . would shock
the moral sense of any civilized community.”) (quoting Oliver Wendall Holmes, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881)).
6
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5209 (2019).
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how his mental illness inhibited his reasoning and appreciation of his crimes.7 While the
constitutionality of the Kansas statute may be touched upon indirectly in this comment, it is not
the primary focus. Despite the Court’s ruling in Kahler, the states have an obligation, under the
theories of punishment, to allow defendants to use the insanity defense. Additionally, this
comment is an appeal to state legislatures, as well as to prosecutors, who are empowered in
their official capacity to pursue lenient sentences on defendants whose mental illness inhibited
their appreciation of the crime they committed. This comment also makes a plea to the
Executive Branch, the Governors on the state level, and the President on a federal level. The
law empowers both offices to act as last bastions of mercy by granting clemency to such
offenders on death row.
Part II of this comment discusses moral blameworthiness, defined under the theories of
punishment, which justify state-sanctioned penalization of individuals who have broken the law.
These moral theories present tangible arguments that have traditionally informed AngloAmerican lawmakers when they defined the requisite punishment for a crime. This comment will
present an overview of the theories of punishment and criminal responsibility, the historical
development of the mens rea approach, and the history and purpose of the insanity defense to
provide this issue some context. Furthermore, the facts and trial proceedings of Kahler will
demonstrate how these theories relate to and inform the necessary availability of the insanity
defense.
Part III discusses why the abolishment of the Kansas insanity defense does not fit within
the traditional Anglo-American theories of punishment. If the state sentences a defendant, who

Howe, supra note 2 (“[T]he key question is whether a defendant is able to distinguish between right and wrong.
People who have a mental disorder should ‘be given the opportunity to at least try’ to make this showing to a jury.”).
7
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may not be culpable for their conduct due to mental illness, to prison, or worse, to death, then the
Kansas statute lacks justification under the theories of punishment. Kansas’s abolishment of the
insanity defense improperly rests on the statute’s narrow following of the mens rea approach.8
The statute focuses solely on general intent and ignores the moral blameworthiness/rational
choice prong traditionally attributed to mens rea.9
This narrow understanding of the mens rea approach is problematic because it does not
consider the emotional stress, distorted thinking, and the myriad of other ways mental illness can
irrationally inform the individual burdened with such an affliction when he or she commits a
crime. Absent such considerations, a wrongdoer’s punishment may be unjust because it does not
accurately reflect the wrongdoer’s moral blameworthiness due to a compromised mental state.
The most appropriate way to rectify Kahler’s improper sentencing is by affording him the
opportunity to admit evidence demonstrating his mental state and knowledge of right and wrong
when he committed his crimes. It should then be up to a jury to decide whether such evidence is
plausible.
Part IV of this comment will appeal to State Legislatures and both the federal and state
Executive Branches. Regardless of the Court’s ruling on the insanity defense’s constitutionality,
state lawmakers should still maintain their laws permitting the insanity defense, while deterring
laws like the Kansas statute. The Court’s upholding of the abolishment of the insanity defense
should not sway the States, who currently allow the insanity defense, toward abolishing it. This
comment is a plea to those forty-six other States to hold their ground.10 Furthermore, this

8

See discussion infra Part III.B.
See case cited infra note 136.
10
Montana, Idaho, and Utah are the only other States to have also abolished the insanity defense like Kansas.
Jenny Williams, Reduction in the Protection for Mentally Ill Criminal Defendants: Kansas Upholds the
Replacement of the M’Naughten Approach with the Mens Rea Approach, Effectively Eliminating the Insanity
Defense [State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kan. 2003)], 44 WASHBURN L.J. 213, 221 (2004).
9
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comment appeals to those States who have abolished the insanity defense, like Kansas, to
reconsider their decision.
Finally, as a last resort, the prosecutors should pursue lesser offenses in situations where
the defendant may be less morally culpable. At the very least, society should examine whether it
is prepared to sentence someone, who may not be morally responsible for the crime committed,
to death. And if society is not prepared to allow such individuals to face execution, then it is up
to Governors or the President to grant them clemency.
With society’s improvements in understanding rational behavior, and the growing
concern over the widespread prevalence of mental illness in the United States, the abolishment of
the insanity defense is a step backward to a time when society ignored such issues.

Part II
Criminal confinement and sanctions exclusively relate to punishment based on moral
blameworthiness.11 In Part II, an introduction to criminal responsibility and its relationship to
the morally blameworthiness prong of mens rea will demonstrate why the state may justly punish
and deprive liberty from one of its citizens. Under criminal responsibility, it is prudent to discuss
the (1) historical development of mens rea, and how it evolved into a broadly accepted twoprong test to include (2) moral blameworthiness.
This discussion will demonstrate how the moral blameworthiness prong of the mens rea
approach is necessary to protect against state sanctioned punishment, which is justified under the
modern (B) theories of punishment. These theories of punishment maintain two differing
dominant philosophies underlying the purpose for state punishment: (1) utilitarianism and (2)

11

Paul H. Robinson, Supreme Court Review: Foreword: The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless
Offenders, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 693, 696 (“[C]riminal law would remain committed exclusively to
punishment upon moral blameworthiness and civil law would provide protection as needed through noncondemnatory incarceration or supervision.”).
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retribution. While retribution is the more likely justification for Kahler’s punishment,12
utilitarianism also does not justify the abolition of the insanity defense.
How mens rea and its protection against the undeserving punishment will impact Kahler
lies in the necessity of the insanity defense. An overview of the (C) insanity defense, including
its history, purpose, and evolution will lead to a discussion of (1) Kansas’s decision to abolish
the insanity defense. Finally, a discussion of Kahler’s case (2) State v. Kahler, including the
facts, trial, and jury decision, will conclude Part II’s necessary background information.
A. Criminal responsibility
Criminal responsibility necessitates blame when administering punishment, effectively
suggesting that punishment is unjust when the individual is not blameworthy.13 Since
punishment relies on the infliction of pain on criminals, the state must justify its right to punish
and deprive its citizens of their inherent Anglo-American rights to life, liberty, and property.14 In
order to deprive anyone of their inherent rights, the state must properly determine who it wishes
to hold accountable for the wrongful conduct by determining whether the punishment rightfully
fits the crime committed.15 This determination relies on the modern day theories of punishment
that inform the state’s interest in punishing criminals and to create a fair and just society.16
The doctrine of mens rea protects against underserving punishment because
blameworthiness is an essential aspect for criminal liability.17 If blameworthiness is absent, then

12

Brief for Respondent, infra note 166.
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 3 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. ed. 7th ed. 2015) (“It
is deeply rooted in our moral sense of fitness that punishment entails blame and that, therefore, punishment may not
justly be imposed where the person is not blameworthy.” (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, Why Substantive Criminal
Law -- A Dialogue, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 10 (1980)).
14
Id., at 11.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Stephen F. Smith, “Innocence” and the Guilty Mind, 69 Hastings L.J. 1609, 1619.
13
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state sanctioned punishment is “morally undeserved.”18 Therefore, while Kansas only includes
intent to kill as its basis for mens rea, the historical development of mens rea suggests that moral
blameworthiness is an essential element of the approach. Before one may understand the
modern theories of punishment, a discussion of the blameworthiness prong of mens rea and its
development will demonstrate how mens rea informs the state’s justification for punishment.
1. Historical Development of the Mens Rea Approach
The legal system in the United States derives from the Anglo legal tradition in England.19
Evidence suggests that early Anglo-Saxon law recognized that a “culpable state of mind must
accompany harmful conduct in order for criminal liability to exist.”20 Anglo law had its roots in
a form of strict liability, where the state would punish a wrongdoer, regardless of premeditative
intent, to dissuade reprisal from the victim or the victim’s family; however, certain offenses such
as homicide or arson required proof of intent.21 For example, the state may have sentenced to
death a citizen who has killed another out of self-defense, but a royal pardon was available to
mitigate the sentencing if the killer lacked intent to kill.22
A systematic form of punishment had not emerged until the twelfth century, where there
occurred a rise in the state’s interest in punishing certain harmful acts, rather than just issuing
monetary compensation for harm.23 The emergence of criminal law included the mental element

Id. (“Stated differently, the objection to punishment in the absence of blameworthiness is that such punishment is
morally underserved.”).
19
Origins of American Law, LUMEN LEARNING, https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundlesspoliticalscience/chapter/origins-of-american-law/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).; See also Jean K. Gilles Phillips &
Elizabeth Cateforis, Self-Defense: What’s a Jury Got to Do with It?, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1143, 1156 (2009) (“While
in its infancy, America turned to English common law to lay the groundwork for our legal system.”).
20
See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and
Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 651 (1993).
21
Id., at 652-53.
22
Id., at 653.
23
Id., at 645 (stating that this new form of punishing wrongdoers gave rise to the modern-day distinction of criminal
law and tort law).
18
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of mens rea as a requirement for punitive sanctions to justify this new system of state
punishment.24
By the end of the twelfth century, Christian canon law greatly influenced the
development of this system of criminal law.25 From its inception, Christian morality emphasized
mental culpability and sinfulness.26 This is not to say that “crime” is synonymous with “sin” in
the legal context.27 Henry Bracton, a cleric and judge, produced highly influential treatises
codifying St. Augustine’s foundational principle that “justifiable punishment is premised on and
proportional to moral guilt.”28 Here, historical evidence indicates that Bracton first suggested the
concept of malice within the context of culpability and the guilty mind.29 Furthermore, he even
used words familiar to modern-day criminal law, such as “premeditated” and “wickedly” in his
writings.30 Bracton believed that a crime could not be committed unless the actor possessed the
intent to injure.31
2. Moral Blameworthiness
Bracton suggested that in addition to the intent to injure, the offender’s ulterior motives,
or purposes, for committing the harmful conduct must be blameworthy to render the offender

24

Mens rea, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/mens-rea?s=ts (last visited Nov. 11, 2019). The
literal translation of mens rea derives from the Latin for a “guilty mind;” Id., at 654 (“[F]rom the earliest times
attention was directed to a mental element as a requirement for the commission of certain…offenses.”).
25
Gardner, supra note 20, at 654.
26
Id. at 651 (“Jesus taught that outward actions are mere evidence of one’s moral worth, reinforcing earlier ideas
that ‘as a man thinketh in his heart, so is he.’”).
27
Id., at 659 (“Bracton clearly did not espouse the view that crime and sin were synonymous…. The malicious
executioner commits a sinful act but remains within the law. This is perhaps either because he commits no unlawful
act or because policy reasons allow the act in this unique case.”).
28
Id., at 655 (“In the canonist spirit, Bracton wrote that ‘it is will and purpose which mark maleficia’ and ‘a crime is
not committed unless the intention to injure exists.’”).
29
Phillips & Cateforis, supra note 19, at 1156.
30
Id. (explaining that in writing about arson Bracton used words such as “premediated” and “wickedly”).
31
Id. (“Bracton wrote: ‘we must consider with what mind (animo) or with what intent (voluntate) a thing is done, in
fact or in judgment, in order that it may be determined accordingly what action should follow and what
punishment.’”).
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culpable.32 Moral blameworthiness required that the actor committed the wrongful conduct with
“a free, voluntary, and rational choice to do evil.”33 Interestingly, Bracton’s theories and written
work led him to further take notice of the person who may be suffering from a mental illness and
how that may play a role in culpability.34 Bracton suggested that society should not hold the
person suffering from mental illness criminally liable because of that person’s lack of reason.35
The progression toward the more modern mens rea approach was born out of two
nineteenth century English cases, Regina v. Prince (1875) and Regina v. Faulkner (1877).36
These two cases demonstrated a shift in the understanding of the mens rea approach. The single
mens rea requirement, the intent to do something immoral or criminal, now became a dual
requirement, where the second prong, the intention “to do something that might reasonably be
expected to lead to the harm of the particular offense charged,” emerged to create a two-part
test.37
This two-part analysis led to a broader understanding of mens rea that continued until
modern day. In the United States, the American Law Institute (hereinafter “ALI”) sought to
codify substantive criminal law, and produced the widely influential Model Penal Code
(hereinafter “MPC”).38 The MPC sought to modernize criminal law by producing a “logical
framework for defining offenses and a consistent body of general principles” relating to criminal

Gardner, supra note 26, at 658 (explaining that Bracton’s references to “will” and “purpose” support the
conclusion that motives must also be blameworthy in addition to intent).
33
Id.
34
Id. at 662.
35
Id. (noting that Bracton excluded “madmen” from criminal liability because they “lack reason” in committing
their criminal acts).
36
Mens Rea: The Development of Mens Rea, LAW LIBRARY - AMERICAN LAW AND LEGAL INFORMATION,
https://law.jrank.org/pages/1583/Mens-Rea-development-mens-rea.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
37
Id.
38
Model Penal Code, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, https://www.ali.org/publications/show/model-penal-code/
(last visited Oct. 25, 2019).
32
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intent.39 Regarding the initial mens rea approach, the common law had often grouped the
offenses into specific and general intent; however, criminal law has abandoned this grouping in
favor of an elemental analysis.40 The MPC used the logical conception of an elemental analysis
by describing the minimum threshold of culpability as “a person is not guilty of an offense unless
he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to
each material element of the offense.”41 The MPC emphasized “consciousness” and
“awareness” to establish culpability.42
This brief overview of the mens rea approach’s development and its evolution into a test,
which includes moral blameworthiness, demonstrates its complicated relationship with
punishment. Remember, without blameworthiness the state has no justification for punishing
one of its citizens.43 Therefore, by analyzing the theories of punishment the state uses to justify
punishment of one of its citizens, the justification for the moral blameworthiness prong of mens
rea becomes clearer.
B. Theories of Punishment
Despite the concept of “punishment” being generally understood by many cultures, no
single collective definition of the term “punishment” actually exists.44 Nonetheless, two

39

Model Penal Code, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/Model%20Penal%20Code (last
visited Oct. 25, 2019).
40
Mens Rea: The Development of Mens Rea, supra note 26 (“A different level of culpability is required as to
different elements of the same offense.”).
41
See id; Model Penal Code § 2.02(1).
42
For example, under § 2.02(2)(a)(i) in defining “purposely”, the MPC defines it as a person’s “conscious object to
engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result.” In § 2.02(2)(b)(i), “knowingly” is defined as a person
being “aware” of his conduct or the existence of the attendant circumstances. Furthermore, “recklessly” and
“negligently” are, respectively, defined when the person has “a conscious disregard” for the conduct, or when the
person “should have been aware” that the conduct would pose a risk.
43
See Robinson, supra note 11.
44
DRESSLER, supra note 13.
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dominant philosophies have traditionally governed the theories of punishment, which underlie
society’s justification for state sanctioned criminal punishment.45
The first philosophy is referred to as utilitarianism, whose adherents believe that laws are
put in place to “maximize the net happiness of society.”46 More succinctly, those who follow
this approach believe human beings act out of their own self-interest, reacting to both pain and
pleasure.47 In the context of criminal laws, society deters its members from carrying out a crime
if that member understands and appreciates the existence of risks and repercussions such as
detection, conviction, and detention.48
The second theory of punishment, more relevant to the Kahler case, is referred to as
retributivism.49 The retributivist philosophical approach suggests that punishing a member of
society is wholly justifiable when deserved.50 The wrongdoer, as a member of society, rightfully
faces deserving discipline from the member’s peers when he or she chooses to commit a crime,
thereby causing harm toward the rest of society.51 Retributivism is more relevant to Kahler’s
case because those supporting the Kansas statute believe Kahler’s death sentence is a proper way
to make him realize the seriousness of his crimes, and for his peers to affirm judgment upon
him.52

45

Punishment: Theories of Punishment, LAW LIBRARY - AMERICAN LAW AND LEGAL INFORMATION,
https://law.jrank.org/pages/9576/Punishment-THEORIES-PUNISHMENT.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).
46
DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 14.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Ethan Bercott, The Sheriff, The Innocent, and the Assassin’s Assassin: How Denunciation Theory Answers an Old
Riddle, 88 MISS. L.J. 91, 111 (2019) (“Two penological theories have dominated mainstream debates over society’s
moral right to punish.”).
50
DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 16.
51
Id.
52
See infra note 182.
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This comment shall first examine utilitarianism, before moving on to retributivism.
Retributivism’s relevance in Kahler’s case is clearer by demonstrating the juxtaposition between
the two theories of punishment and their overall goals.
1. Utilitarianism
Most scholars generally define utilitarianism as a means to punish the criminal by
ejecting the criminal from society, whether that is by imprisonment or death sentence.53
Fundamentally, a utilitarian believes that a necessary “utility” should exist for the actor to
deserve moral punishment.54 The “utility” approach relies on the belief that a law should
distribute punishment equally to the actor’s blameworthiness because it will more effectively
prevent crimes than a law enacted with the sole purpose to punish.55
Utilitarianism has many different iterations, and theorists have mostly classified it into
subcategories. The most common types of utilitarianism are incapacitation, general deterrence,
specific deterrence, and rehabilitation.56 Incapacitation may also be referred to as restraint,
isolation, or disablement.57 The goal of incapacitation is to prevent the criminal from causing
further harm to society.58
The next form of utilitarianism, deterrence, is broken down into two subcategories,
general and specific. The goal of general deterrence is to punish the wrongdoer so to deter the
rest of society from engaging in similar criminal conduct, by instilling fear in others who may be

53

DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 15.
Stephen F. Smith, Symposium on Overcriminalization: Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 537, 569 (“The fundamental insight here is that there is considerable “utility” in moral “desert” - that a
criminal law which distributes punishment according to blameworthiness will more effectively achieve its crimeprevention goals than one that punishes regardless of the moral sentiments of the community.”).
55
Id.
56
DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 16.
57
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 27 (Thomson West ed., 4th ed. 2003).
58
Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified., 42 STAN. L.
REV. 1149, 1150 (1990).
54
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debating whether or not to violate the law.59 Simply put, society utilizes the punishment as a
warning to other potential wrongdoers and to demonstrate the consequences of criminal acts.60
Criminal law recognizes specific deterrence as the other form of deterrence, which at times is
referred to as individual deterrence.61 Society uses this form of punishment to deter that exact
offender, the person who committed the crime, from engaging in future misconduct.62
After deterrence, criminal law recognizes rehabilitation as the other utilitarian goal. This
goal is less to instill fear or to deter the offender, rather it is a form of reconciliation to society
where the offender will accrue the proper skills and values that will transition that offender from
criminal into law-abiding citizen.63 In some sense, rehabilitation is a way of reform, or
correction.64 This theory of reform relies on the belief that human behavior is the result of
identifiable prior causes, and that therapeutic treatment can better effect changes in human
behavior.65
2. Retributivism
Utilitarianism understands punishment to be justified when one looks forward to see how
such punishment will maximize the future benefit of society.66 In contrast, retributivism looks
backward toward the past, focusing on the wrongdoer’s state of mind and the crime or crimes
committed.67 Retributivists understand wrongdoers deserve punishment because the wrongdoers

59

See DRESSLER, supra note 13.
Benjamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10 ND J. L. ETHICS &
PUB POL’Y 99, 128 (1996).
61
DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 15.
62
Id.
63
Blecker, supra note 58, at 1150.
64
LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 27.
65
Id.
66
Richard S. Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the
Supreme Court., 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1303, 1310 (1988).
67
Id.
60

14

possessed free will.68 Punishment is given when a societal member has chosen to offend certain
shared morals.69 As a result, that member now owes a debt to society for the harm he or she has
caused.70
Retributivism is the infliction of pain and suffering on the criminal to the extent the
criminal chose to violate societal laws.71 There is a general consensus among theorists that
retributivism is the oldest theory of punishment, connoting humanity’s basic tendency to enact
revenge or retaliation on another who has caused harm.72 To retributivists, punishment provides
no utilitarian benefit, it only functions as a means toward justice where the offender receives the
“just desert of [their] deeds.”73
In one form of retributive theory, criminals become a stain on society, and thus morally
acceptable to hate.74 Punishment prior to the twelfth-century formation of mens rea and the
systematic distribution of state punishment illustrate this type of retribution.75 Another form of
retributivism, protective retribution, restores a sense of moral balance that was lost from the
wrongdoer’s harmful conduct.76 Under this approach, a harmony or perfect equilibrium exists in
society with all members receiving the same benefits and burdens as each other.77 The

68

Tufik Y. Shayeb, Behavioral Genetics & Criminal Culpability: Addressing The Problem of Free Will in the
Context of the Modern American Justice System, 19 UDC-DCSL L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2016).
69
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 625
(6th ed. 2014).
70
Id.
71
Blecker, supra note 58, at 1150.
72
LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 29.
73
DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 16 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 197-8 (W. Hastie
translation 1887).
74
Id., at 17.
75
Gardner, supra note 26, at 646-47 (noting that responses to harmful conduct could have taken the
form of the blood feud where the law left offenders unprotected against the vengeance of those who suffered by the
offenders’ misdeeds).
76
Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1060 (2012).
77
DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 17-8.
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wrongdoer owes a debt to society because he or she has taken an unfair advantage of these
benefits and burdens from others, destroying society’s moral balance.78
Finally, another form of retribution that seeks to justify punishment is victim vindication,
which suggests the wrongdoer has elevated his or her value above that of the victim.79 Similar to
protective retribution, victim vindication protects a societal moral balance by denouncing the
wrongdoer’s false “claim” of higher moral worth over the victim.80 In some sense, this type of
retribution is seemingly a bit more revenge focused because there exists a desire for the
wrongdoer to suffer like the victim had suffered.81
Where assaultive retribution is the least likely justification for punishing Kahler by
imprisonment and death, proponents of Kahler’s punishment rely both on protective retribution
and victim vindication to justify his punishment, especially in the sense of victim vindication
where the community agreed Kahler should suffer the death penalty.82 In Kahler’s situation,
there lies a distinct issue with these forms of retributive justice pertaining to moral balancing.
The descriptions of these forms of retributivism seem to assume mental competency, and that
someone like Kahler fully appreciated the committed crimes. In fact, the wrongdoer may have
not created a moral imbalance when acting under the influence of an external force, like, for
example, a mental illness that impedes the wrongdoer’s free will.83 Therefore, if Kahler’s mental
illness prevented him from knowingly elevating his worth over that of his victims, or taking an

78

Adam L. Dulberg, State v. Robert: Why Mitigation Waivers During Capital Sentencing Undermine Fundamental
Justifications of Punishment, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 483, 501 (2014).
79
Id., at 502.
80
Id.
81
Dan Markel and Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98
Calif. L. Rev. 907, 974 (2010).
82
See infra note 182.
83
Dulberg, supra note 78 (“However, a defendant ‘has not derived an unfair advantage if he could not have
restrained himself or if it is unreasonable to expect him to behave otherwise than he did.’”) (quoting Herbert Morris,
Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475, 476-79 (1968)).

16

unfair advantage of the benefits and burdens evenly distributed to all members of society, then
these retributive theories should not theoretically apply to Kahler’s case.
If Kahler could not have truly appreciated the gravity of his crimes, or his mental
incapacity hindered his understanding of “right” and “wrong,” then the law should afford him the
opportunity to plead insanity under an affirmative defense. To understand the insanity defense’s
necessity, it is important to comprehend its origins and development to modern day. The
following sections will describe how Kansas’s abolition of the insanity defense do not coincide
with the affirmative defense’s original intent, and how its abolition may be unfair to mentally
incapacitated wrongdoers.
C. Insanity Defense
Scholars trace the notion of insanity back to antiquity, even as early as second century
Jewish law and sixth century Justinian Code in Ancient Rome.84 Most states use the M’Naghten
test as the modern approach toward understanding moral culpability, and, in fact, until the mid1990s, all states, except for New Hampshire, applied this as the affirmative defense of insanity.85
This approach originated out of a case in England, where Daniel M’Naghten attempted to
assassinate the Prime Minister, Robert Peel, but instead mistakenly identified Edward
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Drummond, the Prime Minister’s secretary, as Peel, and murdered Drummond.86 M’Naghten
believed Peel had been persecuting him, and, after the police denied M’Naghten protection, he
decided Peel’s assassination was necessary in a last attempt to save his own life.87 The jury
acquitted M’Naghten, believing his actions to be the result of paranoid schizophrenic delusions
that inhibited him from appreciating right from wrong, subsequently sending him to an asylum
for the remainder of his life.88
Under the M’Naghten approach, mental illness is a defense when it impairs the offender’s
cognition to the point that the offender cannot appreciate right conduct from wrong conduct.89
Some states broadened the M’Naghten approach to include volitional impairment creating the
“irresistible impulse” test.90 This test suggests that at the time of the offense, a person is insane
when the wrongdoer acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse, lost the power to
choose between right and wrong, or the actor’s will was so completely destroyed that those
actions are no longer subject to the offender’s will and now beyond the offender’s control.91
This is a relatively controversial test because of its broad definition, where some critics are
concerned it would increase false insanity acquittals.92 Furthermore, there exists a fundamental
difficulty to tangibly distinguish between the impulses that are controllable from those that are
uncontrollable.93
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Other jurisdictions interpreted the M’Naghten test broadly to focus on the actor’s ability
to recognize the wrongfulness of the act.94 These adaptions of the M’Naghten approach also
lead to the MPC test.95 After the acquittal of John Hinckley (hereafter “Hinckley”), who pled
insanity, after attempting to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, the public called for a
narrower definition of the insanity defense, and some even campaigned to have it abolished
altogether.96
1. Kansas and the Insanity Defense
The American public was upset that a jury acquitted Hinckley, who was ultimately
released after thirty-five years of psychiatric confinement.97 The Kansas legislature
demonstrated its particular disappointment in the Hinckley acquittal by deciding to redefine its
approach toward the insanity defense.98 In 1995, Kansas abolished the insanity defense
altogether,99 enacting a new statute which states: “[i]t is a defense to a prosecution under any
statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the mental state required
as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease or defect is not otherwise a defense.”100
This statute focuses solely on intent to kill and disregards the wrongfulness inquiry put forth by
the M’Naghten ruling.101
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Evidence regarding the defendant’s mental state is no longer admissible under the Kansas
statute abolishing the insanity defense.102 Furthermore, the jury does not consider the question of
the defendant’s cognition, or overall sanity, at the time the defendant committed the wrongful
act.103 The excuse is only present if the defendant can prove that the mental disease or defect
prevented any formulation of the intent to commit the criminal act in question.104 Only three
other states in addition to Kansas have abolished the insanity defense: Montana, Idaho, and
Utah.105 All of these States’ higher courts have held that the mens rea intent to kill approach is
constitutional, and that the court should not consider the insanity defense a fundamental principle
of law.106
In contrast, other states have actually held that the insanity defense is a fundamental
principle of law due to its historical development.107 In fact, some justices in the States who
abolished the insanity defense have acknowledged in their dissents that the court should consider
the insanity defense as a fundamental principle of law.108 The important general distinction
between states that recognize the insanity defense and those that do not occurs in their differing
interpretations of mens rea.109
For example, Nevada understands “wrongfulness” to be an essential part of the mens rea
approach and defines mens rea as a concept where the offender has the “intent to act knowing
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that the act is wrong.”110 In contrast, Kansas, Idaho, Montana, and Utah do not consider the
offender’s knowledge of the wrongful act to be an inherent element of a crime, including a
specific intent crime.111 Regarding murder, these latter four states also do not consider “knowing
the wrongfulness” of the murder as an essential element of this particular crime.112 Therefore, it
seems that knowledge, or appreciation, of the act’s wrongfulness is the essential difference in the
mens rea definitions of the States that acknowledge the insanity defense and those that have
abolished it altogether.
2. State v. Kahler
Kahler’s facts and court analysis demonstrate why the narrow mens rea approach, which
excludes moral blameworthiness and wrongful inquiry, ultimately is contrary to the socially
accepted notions of punishment. In 2008, Kahler, a director of the public utilities department,
lived happily with his wife, Karen, a personal trainer, and three children in Weatherford,
Texas.113 Those who knew Kahler, described him as a proud father and that his family was the
most important aspect of his life.114 In the summer of 2008, Kahler took a new job in Columbia,
Missouri, intending his wife and children to follow him in the Fall of that year.115
Prior to his departure, Karen approached Kahler, informing him about her desire to
engage in an experimental sexual relationship with another female co-worker.116 Kahler
consented to his wife’s new relationship, believing it would end once his family moved to
Missouri.117 Instead, the affair continued, which led to a physical altercation between Kahler and
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Karen, prompting her to file for divorce in January 2009.118 A subsequent altercation took place
in March of that year and Karen filed a battery complaint against Kahler, which led to a widely
publicized arrest.119 After the arrest, Karen moved out of their home, taking with her their three
children.120 The strain from the recent occurrences began to affect his work, and in
August 2009 Kahler lost his new position in Missouri.121 After his dismissal from work, Kahler
decided to return to Kansas and moved in with his parents on their ranch in Meridian.122
On Thanksgiving 2009, Kahler’s son Sean joined him at the Meridian ranch, while Karen
and her two daughters spent Thanksgiving with Karen’s mother in Derby, Kansas.123 Sean
enjoyed his time at the ranch with his father enough to ask his mother if he could stay at the
ranch; however, Karen decided against Sean staying and, without Kahler’s knowledge, picked
Sean up from the ranch before he was supposed to leave for the holiday weekend.124
That evening, Kahler showed up at the grandmother’s home in Derby, shot and killed
Karen, his daughters, and his mother-in-law, but he did not attempt to harm Sean, who fled to a
neighbor’s house to call the police.125 The police found Kahler the next morning and he
surrendered without incident.126
Prosecutors charged Kahler with capital murder, and at trial his defense team introduced
an expert witness to support the argument that Kahler lacked the mental state “required as an
element of the offense charged.”127 Furthermore, experts, both for the prosecution and defense,
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had agreed that Kahler demonstrated signs of major depressive disorder, and obsessivecompulsive, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality tendencies.128 The defense expert
also independently found Kahler to have possible “short-term dissociation,” and that he suffered
compulsive and impulsive behavior that made him feel compelled to commit the crimes without
the ability to refrain from it.129 Furthermore the defense expert, a psychiatrist, testified that
Kahler had “lost touch with reality due to a serious mental disorder.”130 Despite the testimony of
the expert witnesses and the agreement that Kahler suffered from mental illness, the Kansas
statute prevented Kahler from demonstrating that his mental illness inhibited him from
distinguishing right from wrong at the moment he committed the shootings.131 As a result, a jury
convicted Kahler of capital murder, subsequently sentencing him to death, where he currently
continues to reside on death row.132

Part III
The Kansas statute is contrary to the traditional theories of punishment, discussed above,

because when the state sentences a morally blameless defendant incapacitated by mental illness,
to prison or to death, it goes beyond the scope of the state’s power to punish its citizens. First,
the court should allow Kahler at least the (A) opportunity to plead insanity and leave that
evidence up to a jury to decide his mental sanity based on the facts. Second, denying Kahler of
this opportunity improperly rests on (B) the Kansas statute’s narrow following of the mens rea
approach. Since the Kansas statute focuses solely on general intent to kill and ignores the moral
blameworthiness, or rational choice, prong traditionally attributed to the mens rea approach, the
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result is an (C) unjust sentencing under the theories of punishment. This unjust sentencing is
examined and supported by discussions of (1) Kahler’s moral blameworthiness, (2) utilitarianism
and the criminal process, and (3) retributivism and the criminal process.
A. The Opportunity to Plead Insanity
Despite the constitutionality of the Kansas statute, States should not follow Kansas’s
abolishment of the insanity defense under a moral theory of law. Furthermore, since the typical
test for insanity is whether Kahler had the ability to “know or appreciate why the conduct was
wrong,” denying him the opportunity to at least admit this type of evidence is fundamentally
unfair and unjust.133 Ultimately, only the insanity defense alone can provide defendants, whose
mental illness diminishes their capacity to know right from wrong at the time of the crime,
justice, because their lack of culpability exculpates them from blame and punishment.134 Even if
a new trial is ordered and the court allows Kahler to use the insanity defense, he could still be
convicted; however, the insanity defense would have afforded him the fair chance to establish
that mental illness inhibited his appreciation of his crime’s wrongfulness. 135
B. Kansas’s Mens Rea Approach is Too Narrowly Applied
In Kansas, a defendant’s intent to kill is only relevant as far as it directly relates to mens
rea.136 Furthermore, under Kansas law, the question of whether the defendant had the mental
capacity to know right from wrong at the moment of the crime, is irrelevant.137 For example, if
the defendant thought the person he or she strangled was actually a lemon being squeezed, then
this thought process inhibited by a mental illness would be admissible because the defendant

133

See Morse & Bonnie, supra note 130.
Id.
135
Id.
136
Marc Rosen, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 261
(1999).
137
Id.
134

24

intended to squeeze a lemon, not strangle a person.138 In contrast, if the defendant intended to
strangle the person with an intent to kill, but only because of some delusion, then such evidence
is not admissible because this question relies on the defendant’s sanity.139
Given this distinction, it seems inappropriate to solely focus on the defendant’s intent to
kill, while not considering the knowledge prong of mens rea (moral blameworthiness), because
doing so assumes mental illness precludes the defendant’s intent.140 Rather, a defendant may
still be capable of having the required intent while also suffering from a serious mental illness,
which could inhibit the defendant’s ability to know right from wrong.141 Intent to kill and
insanity are not mutually exclusive.142
The focus on intent to kill unfairly punishes someone who does not understand or
appreciate the nature of the crime, which runs contrary to the goal of punishing offenders who
are responsible for their criminal conduct.143 Put more succinctly, criminal responsibility is
premised on the idea of free will, and the insanity defense allows society to distinguish between
those who have committed a crime under their own free will and those whose free will has been
diminished by mental illness.144
The American Bar Association states that the central defining feature of criminal law’s
traditional treatment of persons with mental disorders is the assessment of the defendant’s moral
blameworthiness.145 Depriving judges and juries the ability to assess the moral blameworthiness
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of a defendant betrays any sense of humane judgment.146 Moral blameworthiness is a crucial
part of mens rea because, even though the offender may have intended to commit the harmful
act, the offender may not have understood or appreciated that the act was morally wrong.147 The
element of understanding or appreciating the criminal conduct is “an indispensable predicate for
criminal punishment.”148
C. K.S.A. § 21-5209 Leads to an Unjust Sentencing under the Theories of Punishment
The essential issue regarding morality and the insanity defense is whether the state can
justify punishing a mentally ill person when that serious mental illness may have undermined the
offender’s ability to appreciate the crime committed.149 The moral basis of the insanity defense
is that no member of society can face punishment “without desert and no desert without
responsibility.”150 Criminal responsibility is based on “cognitive competence,” and the actor
who lacks that competence is not deserving of the punishment.151
The capacity to be rational and the capacity to act with a sense of self-control are
understood to be the two essential elements of responsibility.152 The cognitive capacity aspect is
seen in the M’Naghten test, whereas the control test is seen in the irresistible impulse test.153 The
two are combined in the MPC, which asks whether the offender lacked the ability “to appreciate
the criminality (wrongfulness) of actions or to conform conduct to law.”154
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Nonetheless, it is important to prevent the insanity defense from covering all people who
have a mental defect or illness that prohibits rationality or self-control.155 Society could in some
ways use its common sense, and ask itself whether the offender acted with such extreme
irrationality or behaved in a manner so far outside the societal standard that such conduct is
clearly recognized as abnormal.156 Nevertheless, since the societal definitions of permissible
rationality or self-control are somewhat too dynamic to rely on this common sense test, the
insanity defense is best understood under a theory of definable morality by focusing on the
mentally ill person’s moral blameworthiness.157
1. Kahler’s Moral Blameworthiness
A moral blameworthy agent is one who has the capacity to make moral judgments and
may appreciate his or her conduct in relationship to those judgements.158 Society’s
understanding of what constitutes “morally wrong,” “evil,” or “bad,” derives from a corruption
of this ability to make a moral judgment and appreciate moral concern.159 The individuals who
lack the capacity to make such moral judgements, or those who cannot appreciate this moral
corruption, logically should not deserve blame.160 As noted above, without the requisite blame,
the punishment cannot, therefore, be justifiable.161
The qualification of moral blameworthiness plays a crucial role in understanding the
necessity of the insanity defense, and why Kansas’s abolishment of the defense creates a path to
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potentially unjust state-sanctioned punishment. The Kansas statute is incompatible with the
Anglo-American legal tradition and the “commonly-accepted rationales for punishment.”162
Additionally, the statute is an outlier by modern legal standards as well.163 This statute creates
high stakes consequences for persons who are mentally impaired or insane because, without the
insanity defense, these defendants have a greater chance of facing conviction, imprisonment, and
death when they otherwise should have been committed to a mental health institution.164
The utilitarian arguments for incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence (both general
and specific) fail for several reasons.165 Indeed, incapacitation is satisfied through civil
commitment; however, the argument that prison confinement is equally efficient because the
prison staff may adequately treat the defendant along with the general population is seemingly
tenuous at best.166 Furthermore, it is doubtful that that same prisoner can effectively continue the
same treatment in civil confinement after the defendant’s prison term has finished, given the
detrimental effects prison would have on an already mentally ill person.167
Prison treatment is not the same as that of a mental institution, because jails or prisons
suffer from underfunding, architectural limitations, and operational constraints that restrict the
necessary personalized care that mental institutions offer.168 Furthermore, while prisoners may
receive mental health treatment while incarcerated, prisons generally lack a comprehensive
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survey of mental health services, which lead to a lack of broad prison policies regarding mental
health patients, slow response time to an individual suffering from a mental health crisis, and a
lack of developmental treatment standards for ill patients.169 Currently in the United States,
approximately 6%-12% of those in jail and about 16%-24% of those in prison suffer from a
serious mental illness, while there are three to five times as many individuals with mental illness
in prisons than in mental hospitals.170 The insanity defense is a means to prevent the mentally ill
individual from facing the harshness of prison, while receiving the appropriate care and
treatment for the mental defect.171 Therefore, with these numbers steadily increasing, without
the insanity defense, more individuals with mental illness will be subject to the harsh realities of
prison without proper treatment.172
2. Utilitarianism and the Criminal Process
Some may argue that the criminal process works to help mentally ill individuals realize
their actions were wrong; however, this argument incorrectly assumes that the mentally ill
offender competently appreciated the offender’s harmful and morally wrong conduct.173 In
Kahler’s case, rehabilitation is useless because his sentence is death.174 While imprisonment
likely has minimal positive rehabilitative outcomes on severely mentally ill prisoners, no
tangible rehabilitative form of punishment exists for those on death row.175

169

Id., at 276.
SLOBOGIN, supra note 69, at 640
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Brief for Respondent, supra note 166, at 67 (“The criminal process may help some mentally ill individuals come
to understand that their actions were wrong, even if they did not realize it at the time”.).
174
See case cited supra note 113.
175
Arguments in Favor of Capital Punishment, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/capitalpunishment/for_1.shtml
(last visited Nov. 9, 2019) (noting that the death penalty does not rehabilitate the prisoner and then return them to
society, but does give the prisoner the opportunity to repent, express remorse, and spiritually rehabilitate to prepare
themselves for an afterlife).
170

29

Likewise, deterrence fails as a form of just punishment because it again wrongly assumes
the offender has the capability to make a rationally calculated decision to avoid further
punishment after imprisonment.176 In Kahler’s case, specific deterrence is not applicable
because of his death sentence, which denies him any chance of reclaiming his freedom.177
General deterrence may be applicable to prevent other citizens to commit a similar crime.178
Nonetheless, the population suffering from a mental illness like Kahler would not have the
capacity to appreciate the consequences of such actions, nor would they understand that they too
could face the same severe punishment as Kahler.179
3. Retribution and the Criminal Process
Under the theory of retribution, the Kansas statute acknowledges that the intentional
killing of someone cannot make the defendant entirely blameless, even if the defendant did not
know the killing was wrong.180 Those enacting the Kansas statute understood retribution to act
as a way of “securing a moral balance in society” by sentencing Kahler to death.181 Under this
logic, the death sentence would force Kahler to appreciate “the gravity of his crime and to allow
the community as a whole, including the surviving family and friends of the victim[s], to affirm
its own judgment” of his moral blameworthiness.182
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Nonetheless, moral balancing or victim vindication demonstrates dubious justice when
the criminal’s mental illness distorts the awareness of the crime.183 Kansas fails to acknowledge
that an insane person cannot understand the gravity of the crime.184 The essential aspect of the
retribution theory is that “a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability
of the criminal offender.”185 If Kahler cannot understand the nature or gravity of the crime, then
this form of punishment does not bring a moral balance to society.186 In some ways it may bring
an imbalance because society is punishing an individual who is morally blameless and would,
therefore, relegate the mentally ill offender to a lesser level of worth than those who are mentally
sound.

Part IV
While the Kansas statute may permit a mentally ill individual to face execution, certain
discretionary measures exist within the state’s power to maintain justice when criminal law and
morality are at odds.187 For this reason, this comment appeals to the State Legislatures to
maintain their current laws allowing the insanity defense, and they should continue to deter laws
that may seek to abolish the insanity defense.
Furthermore, federal and state prosecutors should recognize when, and when not, to
charge individuals with a severe mental disorder to the fullest extent of the law by using their
power of prosecutorial discretion. This appeal for discretion in the prosecution of an individual
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who may not be blameworthy due to mental incompetency extends to all states, including the
four states that still have laws abolishing the insanity defense. In fact, perhaps this appeal is
even more necessary for those four states.
This comment also appeals to both the federal and state Executive Branches, which have
been granted the distinguished power of clemency. Furthermore, if a defendant was unable to
plead insanity and a court sentenced the defendant to death or life imprisonment, the Executive
Branch should consider its power to grant clemency to this individual. This act of clemency
would not necessarily grant the mentally ill individual his or her freedom, but they should be
properly confined and treated for their illness instead of facing execution or imprisonment with
the general population.
Finally, to reiterate that this appeal for discretionary state action will not set wrongdoers
free, or lead to an increase in superfluous insanity pleas, statistics demonstrating the insanity
defense’s use and success will demonstrate that the use of the insanity defense is rare. Both its
usage and success rates show that it is rare and difficult to accomplish.188 For these reasons,
defense teams may not pursue the defense, or they may enter into a plea agreement or quasi-plea
agreement with the prosecution when necessary.189 Therefore, appealing to prosecutorial
discretion and executive clemency would be more justifiable because its usage is so rare.
A. Prosecutorial Discretion
American law has traditionally afforded prosecutors the weighty responsibility of
deciding the appropriate charges they may bring against the criminal defendant.190 Prosecutors
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have the capacity to offer plea bargains or decline to charge the defendant altogether.191 In
between these two extremes exists the prosecutor’s power to be lenient by offering lesser
sentences the legislature has authorized.192 Under the federal sentencing guidelines, prosecutor’s
ability to seek lesser charges than those authorized by law distinctively hinges on whether the
offender has accepted responsibility for the crime, which usually takes place in the form of a
guilty plea.193 With over ninety percent of cases resolved with guilty pleas, mostly through plea
bargaining, prosecutors utilize their discretion as a common form of providing individualized
justice rather than it being a rare exception.194
The prosecutor officially has an obligation to pursue justice and to punish the wrongdoer
to the extent deserved; however, society’s morality and reason still binds the prosecutor’s
promise to enact justice in an official capacity.195 Put simply, despite the prosecutor’s official
promise to punish wrongdoers, that punishment cannot extend passed what is morally
permissible.196
One key element to keep in mind is that when legislatures enact statutes and draft
criminal laws, they do so conscious of prosecutorial leniency.197 This conscious regard for
prosecutorial leniency leads to the enactment of stricter laws that have a tendency to over
criminalize.198 Where the judiciary may have the ability to limit the legislatures tendency to over
criminalize, it is still bound to statutory intent and legislative supremacy in defining crime.199
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Furthermore, the prosecutor’s discretion to bring or reduce charges limits the judiciary’s power
to curb overcriminalization.200
The judiciary has immense input and power in establishing the future of criminal law,
particularly regarding the abolishment of the insanity defense; however, the ultimate power in
guiding the future of criminal law resides in the legislative branch.201 Since the Court decided
the abolishment of the insanity defense in Kansas is constitutional, it would behoove the
lawmakers in the other forty-six states to hold ground and realize the moral justification for such
a defense. The responsibility to maintain the insanity defense also falls on the prosecutors as it
will ultimately be up to their discretion on how hard they will go after a potentially insane
individual that may lack the requisite blameworthiness.
B. Clemency
An additional appeal to the executive branch exists in the form of clemency. Where
prosecutors may be capable to enact their power to be lenient in bringing certain charges, the
Executive Branch has the power to grant clemency, perhaps most justified when the convicted
mentally ill offender faces the death penalty.202 The law defines clemency as the power to
reduce the defendant’s punishment.203 The Executive Branch, made up of the Governor or a
Board on a state level, and the President on the federal level, are the only offices that hold such
power.204 Clemency can take place in the form of a pardon, or the government’s ability to
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absolve a defendant of legal guilt, and a commutation, where the executive branch may mitigate
or reduce the defendant’s sentencing.205
For example, the Governor of Kansas has the authority to commute Kahler’s death
sentence to one of life in prison. Since the Court ruled the Kansas statute to be constitutional,
upholding his death sentence, then the last bastion of hope for Kahler comes in the form of
clemency. Commutation, however, is extremely rare and would likely be very controversial in
Kahler’s case given the circumstances of his crime.206
This is not to say Kahler absolutely deserves to have his death sentence mitigated because
he is definitely morally blameless. The main danger in abolishing the insanity plea is that
Kahler’s level of blameworthiness is unclear because the Kansas statute prevents him from
offering such evidence in his defense.207 Without the ability to offer this evidence, the risk of
sending someone who is not morally blameworthy to death is much greater than it should be.
Therefore, clemency, like prosecutorial discretion, is a means to prevent the injustice of putting
to death someone who may not be morally blameworthy.208
C. The Insanity Defense is Rare
The availability of the insanity defense does create a concern that anyone can claim to be
insane. Theoretically, the insanity defense’s availability opens up the opportunity for defendants
to use it as a means to exonerate them from their criminal conduct.209 Nonetheless, when
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actually applied, the insanity defense does not innately create a scenario where any mentally ill
defendant may hide behind it to excuse them of fault.210 Defendants rarely utilize the insanity
defense, and in the United States less than one in one-hundred defendants have actually pled
insanity.211 Seventy percent of defendants who have pled insanity usually withdraw the plea
when an expert declared them to be legally sane.212
Insanity pleas are likely rare because of the increase in cost, complexity, and length of the
case.213 The defense must obtain experts, who will spend time with the defendant, review past
medical records, and then testify.214 The increased cost and complexity of such cases are serious
deterrents for pursing the defense, especially if the risk of failure is great.215
With only fifteen to twenty-five percent of cases consisting of an insanity plea ending in
an acquittal, the statistics demonstrate that the insanity defense is more of a rarity then a
normality.216 Furthermore, the insanity defense is not a “get-out-of-jail” card, instead the court
releases only one percent of the acquittals immediately, and those who succeed on the insanity
plea remain in the hospital for an average of three years.217 The deterrents listed above are
enough to ease any fears that the existence of the insanity defense will cascade into an increase
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in insanity pleas as a way to skirt justice and gain freedom.218 Ultimately, it is a very rare
exception demonstrating that society will hold those responsible legally accountable for their
criminal conduct and vice-a-versa.219 Therefore, given the rarity of its use, the insanity defense’s
abolishment serves very little practical purpose, and likely only further impedes justice rather
than achieves it.
Conclusion
This comment examined the theories of punishment and how these theories inform state
sanctioned punishment. Within the Anglo-American tradition, punishment is justified when
there is blame, but if the individual lacks the requisite blameworthiness, then punishment is
unjustified. The level of blameworthiness relies on mens rea, which has ultimately two
interpretations. One interpretation focuses solely on intent to kill, and the other delves one step
further by analyzing the moral blameworthiness or wrongfulness of the offender’s actions.
The tension of these two interpretations are at the core of the Kansas statute, which
adopted a narrow mens rea interpretation. The Kansas statute ignores the moral
blameworthiness or wrongfulness mens rea prong. This interpretation, therefore, has led to the
total abolishment of the insanity defense in Kansas, resulting in the controversial ruling in
Kahler. This comment suggests it is necessary for the remaining State Legislatures to maintain
the insanity defense under the moral legal theories of punishment despite the Court’s ruling on
its constitutionality. Furthermore, this comment makes a plea to prosecutors to be lenient when
charging mentally ill offenders, whose illness may have inhibited their capacity to appreciate
their criminal conduct. Additionally, the Executive Branch, whether that be the Governor on a
state level, or the President on a federal level, has the power to grant clemency in these types of
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cases. It is important they understand the potential injustice of sentencing someone to death who
may not be morally blameworthy of the offense.
It is understandable for society as a whole to want to right a wrong, to bring justice back
to those that have been immeasurably injured by criminal conduct. And yet society must ask at
what cost? What responsibility do we as members of a shared community have to those who are
not culpable for the wrongdoing? Retribution for the sake of inflicting harm on an individual
who may be morally blameless betrays the purpose of state sanctioned punishment and is,
therefore, not true retribution. Instead, it appears to act as something more akin to vengeance or
revenge. The insanity defense tempers those innate predilections and prevents further injustice.
Punishing an individual who may not be morally blameworthy may only cause a chain reaction
of endless revenge, and society will indeed find itself losing its understanding of what true
justified punishment means.
Therefore, in Kahler, the Kansas statute’s improper focus on intent to kill does not reflect
the true purpose of retribution or the state’s justification for punishment. The Kansas statute
imprudently disregards the moral blameworthy prong, allowing blameless actors to face
punishment reserved for culpable offenders. Regardless of the Supreme Court’s decision, the
affirmative defense of insanity is critical to maintain a fair criminal justice system, and its
abolition betrays the very basic tenets of the Anglo-American legal traditions of criminal
punishment.
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